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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
No. 14-1689 
BORIS KHAZIN, 
    Appellant 
v. 
TD AMERITRADE HOLDING CORPORATION;             
TD AMERITRADE INC; 
AMERIVEST INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY; LULE DEMMISSIE, INDIVIDUALLY, 
_____________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2:13-cv-04149) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
_____________ 
Argued: October 23, 2014 
Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG, and COWEN, Circuit 
Judges 
(Opinion Filed: December 08, 2014) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
Alleging that TD Ameritrade had fired him for 
reporting securities violations to his supervisor, Boris Khazin 
filed suit for whistleblower retaliation pursuant to the Dodd-
Frank Act. Although Khazin had signed an arbitration 
agreement with TD Ameritrade, he argued that it had been 
nullified by another provision in Dodd-Frank that prohibits 
the enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements in 
certain whistleblower disputes. The District Court disagreed, 
compelled arbitration, and dismissed the complaint. Khazin’s 
appeal raises issues of first impression in this Circuit 
surrounding the proper interpretation of Dodd-Frank’s 
restrictions on predispute arbitration agreements. Ultimately, 
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though, Khazin’s whistleblower claim is subject to arbitration 
for the simple reason that it is covered by none of these 
restrictions.  
 
I. Background of the Case 
A. Factual Allegations 
 Appellant Boris Khazin is a financial services 
professional and former employee of Appellees TD 
Ameritrade, Inc. and Amerivest Investment Management 
Company (collectively with other Appellees, “TD”). When 
Khazin began working for TD, the parties executed an 
employment agreement in which they agreed to arbitrate all 
disputes arising out of Khazin’s employment.  
 
 At TD, Khazin was responsible for performing due 
diligence on financial products offered to TD customers. 
When he eventually discovered that one of TD’s products was 
priced in a manner that did not comply with the relevant 
securities regulations, he reported this violation to his 
supervisor, Lule Demmissie, and recommended changing the 
price to remedy the violation.  
 
 In response, Demmissie instructed Khazin to conduct 
an analysis of the “revenue impact” of his proposed change. 
The analysis revealed that although remedying the violation 
would save customers $2,000,000, it would cost TD 
$1,150,000 in revenues and negatively impact the balance 
sheet of one of Demmissie’s divisions. After reviewing these 
results, Demmissie allegedly told Khazin not to correct the 
problem and to stop sending her emails on the subject. When 
Khazin subsequently approached her to renew his initial 
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recommendation, she again informed him that no change 
would be made.  
 
 Over the next few months, Demmissie and TD’s 
human resources department confronted Khazin about a 
purported billing irregularity that, according to him, was 
unrelated to his duties and turned out to be nonexistent. 
Nevertheless, Khazin was told that he could no longer be 
trusted, and his employment was terminated.  
 
B. Procedural History 
Khazin filed an amended complaint in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, asserting state-law claims and a 
violation of the Dodd-Frank Act. All of Khazin’s claims were 
premised on the allegation that he had been terminated in 
retaliation for “whistleblowing.” The state court held that 
federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the Dodd-Frank 
claim, dismissed that claim without prejudice for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, and compelled arbitration of the 
state-law claims. 
   
Khazin reasserted his Dodd-Frank claim in a complaint 
filed in the District of New Jersey. After one round of motion 
practice and amendments, TD filed a motion to dismiss the 
amended complaint and to compel arbitration pursuant to 
Khazin’s employment agreement. In response, Khazin 
contended that a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, which we 
will call the “Anti-Arbitration Provision,” and its associated 
regulations prevented TD from compelling the arbitration of 
his whistleblower retaliation claim. The Anti-Arbitration 
Provision states that “[n]o predispute arbitration agreement 
shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires 
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arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(e)(2). According to TD, however, the Anti-
Arbitration Provision did not forbid the arbitration of the 
particular type of retaliation claim that Khazin had brought 
against it. Even if it did cover such claims, TD continued, the 
provision did not apply retroactively to bar the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements executed before the passage of the 
Act, such as the agreement between Khazin and TD.  
 
The District Court granted TD’s motion on the ground 
that the Anti-Arbitration Provision did not prohibit the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements that were executed 
before Dodd-Frank was passed. Specifically, the District 
Court applied the analysis articulated in Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), and concluded that nullifying 
existing contractual rights to arbitration would violate the 
presumption against retroactivity. It did not pass upon the 
question of whether the Anti-Arbitration Provision covered 
the specific retaliation claim advanced by Khazin. Khazin 
then filed the instant appeal.1 
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order 
pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). The District Court had 
subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “‘We 
exercise plenary review over [the] District Court’s decision to 
compel arbitration.’” Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 
230 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Niles 
Audio Corp., 401 F.3d 529, 531 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
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II. Discussion 
 On appeal, Khazin’s primary contention is that the 
District Court erred in finding that his arbitration agreement 
was enforceable notwithstanding the Anti-Arbitration 
Provision and the general anti-arbitration spirit of the Dodd-
Frank Act. This argument fails: neither the Anti-Arbitration 
Provision nor any other provision of Dodd-Frank prohibits 
the arbitration of the sort of claim that Khazin chose to bring 
against TD. The District Court acknowledged that TD had 
made this argument but did not address it further. It is, 
however, “an accepted tenet of appellate jurisdiction that we 
‘may affirm a judgment on any ground apparent from the 
record, even if the district court did not reach it.’” Oss 
Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 761 
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Kabakjian v. United States, 267 F.3d 
208, 213 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 
A. Statutory Framework 
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act spans thousands of pages and amends a 
number of statutes designed to regulate the financial industry. 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Of principal 
importance to this appeal are Dodd-Frank’s amendments to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which “establish[] a 
corporate whistleblowing reward program, accompanied by a 
new provision prohibiting any employer from retaliating 
against ‘a whistleblower’ for providing information to the 
[Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)], 
participating in an SEC proceeding, or making disclosures 
required or protected under [the] Sarbanes-Oxley [Act of 
 7 
 
2002] and certain other securities laws.” Lawson v. FMR 
LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1174 (2014) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(a)(6), (b)(1), (h)). The prohibition on retaliation includes a 
private right of action for aggrieved whistleblowers. See 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i). As Khazin asserts in his 
complaint and reaffirmed at oral argument, this is the cause of 
action he asserts against TD. For the sake of brevity, we will 
refer to it as the “Dodd-Frank” cause of action.  
 
 Before Dodd-Frank was enacted, whistleblowers who 
suffered retaliation for reporting violations of the securities 
laws were not without recourse. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 established a private right of action for whistleblowers 
as well. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A). The Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank causes of action for whistleblowers are, however, 
“substantively different,” and each has its “own prohibited 
conduct, statute of limitations, and remedies.” Ahmad v. 
Morgan Stanley & Co., 2 F. Supp. 3d 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014); see also Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1175. Notably, a 
whistleblower seeking to assert a Sarbanes-Oxley claim must 
first file an administrative complaint with the Secretary of 
Labor through the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”). See 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1514A(b)(1)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(c). The Dodd-Frank 
cause of action, by contrast, has no exhaustion requirement. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B). Moreover, while a Sarbanes-
Oxley whistleblower may obtain “back pay, with interest,” a 
Dodd-Frank whistleblower is entitled to “2 times the amount 
of back pay otherwise owed to the individual, with interest.” 
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(B), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(h)(1)(C)(ii).  
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 The Dodd-Frank Act did not merely create a new 
cause of action for whistleblowers—it also appended the 
Anti-Arbitration Provision to the Sarbanes-Oxley cause of 
action. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 922, 124 Stat. at 1848. As a 
result, the relevant section of the United States Code now 
provides that “[n]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be 
valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a 
dispute arising under th[at] section.” 18 U.S.C. § 
1514A(e)(2).2 In addition to adding the Anti-Arbitration 
Provision to the Sarbanes-Oxley cause of action, Dodd-Frank 
also inserted an anti-arbitration provision with identical 
language into the whistleblower protections of the 
Commodity Exchange Act. See § 748, 124 Stat. at 1746 
(codified at 7 U.S.C.  
§ 26(n)(2)). A similar provision appears in the portion of 
Dodd-Frank that pertains to the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, which is entitled the “Consumer Financial 
Protection Act of 2010.” See §§ 1001, 1057, 124 Stat. at 
1955, 2031 (“[N]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be 
valid or enforceable to the extent that it requires arbitration of 
a dispute arising under this section.”) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
5567(d)(2)).  
 
                                              
2 The immediately preceding paragraph, which Khazin does 
not invoke, similarly provides that “[t]he rights and remedies 
provided for in this section may not be waived by any 
agreement, policy form, or condition of employment, 
including by a predispute arbitration agreement.” 18 U.S.C. § 
1514A(e)(1). Because this paragraph and its analogues, 7 
U.S.C. § 26(n)(1) and 12 U.S.C. § 5567(d)(1), do not affect 
the analysis, we do not address them further.  
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B. The Arbitrability of Dodd-Frank Retaliation Claims 
 
 The text and structure of Dodd-Frank compel the 
conclusion that whistleblower retaliation claims brought 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) are not exempt from 
predispute arbitration agreements. As this is the only type of 
claim that Khazin asserts, nothing prevents TD from seeking 
to enforce their arbitration agreement.  
 
 The Anti-Arbitration Provision is expressly limited to 
a single category of disputes: those “arising under this 
section,” meaning Section 1514A of the United States Code. 
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) (emphasis added). That section 
contains the Sarbanes-Oxley cause of action for retaliation 
against whistleblowers. See id. § 1514A(a)-(c). The Dodd-
Frank cause of action, however, is not located in the same 
title of the United States Code, let alone the same section. See 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h).3 As Khazin asserts only a Dodd-Frank 
                                              
3 To be sure, the Anti-Arbitration Provision and the Dodd-
Frank cause of action for retaliation are both located in the 
same “section” of the Dodd-Frank Act, entitled “Sec. 922. 
Whistleblower Protection.” 124 Stat. at 1841-48. But this is 
not the “section” to which the Anti-Arbitration Provision 
refers. The portion of Section 922 concerning the Anti-
Arbitration Provision amends “Section 1514A of title 18, 
United States Code . . . by adding [that provision] at the end.” 
§ 922(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 1848. The portion of Section 922 that 
establishes the new cause of action for retaliation inserts that 
cause of action into “[t]he Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) . . . after section 21E.”  
§ 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841. It would be nonsensical for the 
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claim, his dispute does not “arise under” the relevant section. 
See Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 161 F.3d 156, 162 
(3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a plaintiff’s claims “arise under” 
the statute that provides “the federal cause of action [he or 
she] alleges”). For the same reason, he cannot avail himself of 
the analogous provisions in the Commodity Exchange Act 
and Consumer Financial Protection Act, both of which apply 
only to disputes arising under their respective sections of the 
Code. See 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2); 12 U.S.C. § 5567(d)(2).  
 
 Recognizing that no provision expressly restricts the 
arbitration of Dodd-Frank retaliation claims, Khazin contends 
that a bill as massive as Dodd-Frank will inevitably contain 
gaps not intended by Congress. The fact that Congress did not 
append an anti-arbitration provision to the Dodd-Frank cause 
of action while contemporaneously adding such provisions 
elsewhere suggests, however, that the omission was 
deliberate. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 
174 (2009) (“When Congress amends one statutory provision 
but not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.”). 
Indeed, the contrast is all the more glaring because the 
amendments to Sarbanes-Oxley, including the Anti-
Arbitration Provision, are adjacent to the Dodd-Frank cause 
of action in the text of the Dodd-Frank Act. See § 922, 124 
Stat. at 1841-48.  
 
 Khazin further argues that it would be counterintuitive 
for Congress to treat Sarbanes-Oxley claims differently than 
                                                                                                     
word “section” in the Anti-Arbitration Provision to refer to 
Section 922 of the Act when Section 922 expressly places its 
constituent parts in separate “sections” of the Code.  
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Dodd-Frank claims, and that requiring the arbitration of his 
claim would undermine Dodd-Frank’s broader purpose of 
enhancing protections for whistleblowers. As explained 
above, however, the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank causes 
of action differ significantly in a number of respects that 
might explain Congress’s reluctance to exempt Dodd-Frank 
claims from arbitration. Moreover, “[s]tatutes are seldom 
crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to 
their enactment may require adopting means other than those 
that would most effectively pursue the main goal.” Landgraf, 
511 U.S. at 286. For this reason, “[i]nvocation of the ‘plain 
purpose’ of legislation at the expense of the terms of the 
statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise 
and, in the end, prevents the effectuation of congressional 
intent.” Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension 
Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986). Congress’s intent is 
clearly reflected in the text and structure of Dodd-Frank, 
which grant Khazin no right to resist arbitration.  
 
 This legislative choice must be respected, especially in 
light of the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements” embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act. Moses 
H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24 (1983). Courts are required to “enforce agreements to 
arbitrate according to their terms[,] . . . . even when the claims 
at issue are federal statutory claims, unless the FAA’s 
mandate has been ‘overridden by a contrary congressional 
command.’” CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 
665, 669 (2012) (quoting Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)). There is no such 
command here. Thus, although Congress conferred on 
whistleblowers the right to resist the arbitration of certain 
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types of retaliation claims, that right does not extend to Dodd-
Frank claims arising under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h). 
 The only two courts to have addressed the question 
have concluded that, for the reasons outlined above, 
whistleblowers may be compelled to arbitrate Dodd-Frank 
retaliation claims. See Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 
5914 (KPF), 2014 WL 285093, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 
2014); Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., SACV 11-00734-CJC(JCGx), 
2011 WL 4442790, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011). Khazin 
argues that the Fourth Circuit suggested otherwise in Santoro 
v. Accenture Federal Services, LLC, 748 F.3d 217 (4th Cir. 
2014). But although Santoro contains broad language 
suggesting that “Dodd-Frank whistleblower claims are not 
subject to predispute arbitration,” the Fourth Circuit 
confronted an entirely different issue and did not even 
mention the whistleblower provision codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-6. 748 F.3d at 222.  
 
 The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of Dodd-Frank in 
Santoro does, however, have some relevance to the proper 
interpretation of the Anti-Arbitration Provision. Santoro was 
not a whistleblower; the claims he brought against his former 
employer arose under unrelated federal statutes. He 
nevertheless argued that certain anti-arbitration provisions 
enacted as part of Dodd-Frank nullified his arbitration 
agreement. As noted above, Dodd-Frank’s amendments to the 
whistleblower protections in Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Commodity Exchange Act provide (in identical language) 
that “[n]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or 
enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute 
arising under this section.” 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 
1514A(e)(2). Seizing on the literal meaning of these 
provisions, Santoro argued that “Dodd-Frank invalidates in 
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toto all arbitration agreements by publicly-traded companies 
that lack a carve-out for . . . whistleblower claims, even if the 
plaintiff is not a whistleblower.” 748 F.3d at 220 (footnote 
omitted). He bolstered his argument by drawing a contrast to 
the analogous provision in the Consumer Financial Protection 
Act, which prohibits predispute arbitration agreements only 
“to the extent that [they] require[] arbitration of a dispute 
arising under this section.” 12 U.S.C. § 5567(d)(2) (emphasis 
added). 
  
 The Fourth Circuit rejected Santoro’s interpretation of 
the anti-arbitration provisions, reasoning that Congress’s 
purpose was not to “requir[e] every employer’s arbitration 
agreement to carve out an exception for whistleblowers.” 
Santoro, 748 F.3d at 223. Such a requirement would 
substantially amend the Federal Arbitration Act, and 
“‘Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it 
does not one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.’” Id. 
(quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006)). 
Khazin does not make Santoro’s argument, but it is, in any 
event, unpersuasive for the reasons articulated by the Fourth 
Circuit. 
 
 Khazin cites regulatory actions that are of no help to 
him either. In 2012, the SEC approved a proposed change to 
the arbitration rules of the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”). See Order Approving a Proposed Rule 
Change Amending FINRA Rules 13201 and 2263 Relating to 
Whistleblower Disputes in Arbitration, 77 Fed. Reg. 15,824 
(Mar. 12, 2012) (hereinafter “SEC Order”). Rule 13201(b) of 
FINRA’s Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes 
now provides that “[a] dispute arising under a whistleblower 
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statute that prohibits the use of predispute arbitration 
agreements is not required to be arbitrated.”  
 As explained above, however, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) is 
not “a whistleblower statute that prohibits the use of 
predispute arbitration agreements.” The rule’s inapplicability 
is confirmed by both the SEC Order and FINRA Regulatory 
Notice 12-21, which explains the rule change. In their 
discussion of the Dodd-Frank Act, both state that the Anti-
Arbitration Provision “invalidate[s] predispute arbitration 
agreements in the case of SOX whistleblower disputes.”4 SEC 
Order, 77 Fed. Reg. at 15,824 (emphasis added); accord 
FINRA Regulatory Notice 12-21 at 2 (Apr. 2012). Nowhere 
do they mention the new Dodd-Frank cause of action for 
whistleblower retaliation.5  
 
                                              
4 “SOX” is an acronym for Sarbanes-Oxley.  
5 Khazin also contends that explicit language restricting the 
arbitration of Dodd-Frank retaliation claims is unnecessary 
because, according to the SEC, “under Section 29(a) [of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934], employers may not require 
employees to waive or limit their anti-retaliation rights.” 
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 34,300, 34,304 (June 13, 2011). These rights do not, 
however, include the right to a judicial forum. The Supreme 
Court has unequivocally held that “Congress did not intend 
for § 29(a) to bar enforcement of all predispute arbitration 
agreements.” McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238. We have 
considered Khazin’s remaining arguments and find them to 
be without merit. 
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 Even if the SEC and FINRA were to interpret the Anti-
Arbitration Provision as covering Dodd-Frank claims, we 
would not be obligated to defer to their interpretation. The 
default rule articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is that 
“[s]tatutory ambiguities will be resolved, within the bounds of 
reasonable interpretation, not by the courts but by the 
administering agency.” City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 133 
S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013). However, “[a]n agency has no 
power to ‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by 
rewriting unambiguous statutory terms. Agencies exercise 
discretion only in the interstices created by statutory silence 
or ambiguity; they must always give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Util. Air 
Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Congress was not “silent” 
on the question of whether Dodd-Frank whistleblowers may 
avoid arbitration. By adding anti-arbitration provisions to 
certain statutes but not others, it expressed its intent 
unambiguously. 
  
III. Conclusion 
 
 Khazin’s Dodd-Frank retaliation claim is not 
statutorily exempt from the arbitration agreement with TD. 
The District Court’s order dismissing the complaint and 
compelling arbitration will therefore be affirmed on this 
ground.6 
                                              
6 Consequently, we express no opinion on whether the 
District Court properly concluded that the Anti-Arbitration 
Provision does not invalidate preexisting agreements. 
